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CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE: DIMENSIONS OF VULNERABILITY  
AND FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS’ EXIT FROM WAR-AFFLICTED COUNTRIES 
ABSTRACT 
Research Summary 
When war occurs in a country, some foreign MNEs stay on, while others flee. We argue 
that MNE responses to external threats depend on the firm’s vulnerability, which we decompose 
into exposure (proximity to threat), at-risk resources (potential for loss), and resilience (capacity 
for coping). We test the independent and interactive effects of these dimensions using a geo-
referenced sample of 1,162 MNE subsidiaries in 20 war-afflicted countries over 1987–2006. We 
find that highly valuable resources can become liabilities when exposed to harm, and the best 
way to cope with external threats may be to exit. Our findings extend the resource based view 
and real options theory by demonstrating the bounded value of resources and options in the face 
of environmental contingencies. 
Managerial Summary  
A recent Economist Intelligence Unit survey of board-level MNE executives revealed 
that 30% of the respondents believed that their firms were exposed to collateral damage from 
war, with more than 90% expecting these risks to rise. Yet, 25% of the executives indicated that 
their firms had no continuity plan in place. Our study of MNEs operating in war-afflicted 
countries highlights the costs of not having a response strategy in place. We find that, in war 
zones, otherwise highly valuable locations and resources can become sources of vulnerability 
that prompt early firm withdrawal from a host country. Our work further highlights the value of 
real options thinking – where structural solutions such as building redundancy into a portfolio of 
options may exist in advance of problems – for navigating hostile environments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The overseas operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are increasingly exposed to 
war. The number of violent wars worldwide, for example, rose from 176 in 2013 to 223 in 2015 
(HIIK, 2013, 2015). MNE investments in least developed countries, many of which are afflicted 
by war, increased from $0.6 billion in 1990 to $23.2 billion in 2014 (UNCTAD, 2015). Despite 
the growing salience of war for MNEs, why and how they respond to outbreaks of war in host 
countries has received little attention in the field of management.  
As high-consequence events, wars represent a significant political risk for MNEs, but are 
often treated as low probability and low potential-for-loss events (EIU, 2007). For example, 
during Libya’s 2012 civil war, the firm Cinnabon chose to stay despite the bloodshed 
(BusinessWeek, 2012). In 2013, amid killings by militants in Algeria, foreign MNEs tightened 
security but none left the country (Krauss and Reed, 2013).  
Since much of our understanding about firm strategies in war zones is gleaned from 
aggregate statistics or anecdotes, we know little about what explains MNEs’ idiosyncratic 
responses. Our study helps to explain why some foreign MNEs stay on while others leave when 
war breaks out in a host country. We contend that exit rates depend on firm vulnerability, which 
we characterize in terms of three dimensions: exposure (the extent to which an external threat is 
experienced proximally), at-risk resources (the value of an MNE’s global portfolio in the host 
country that would be extremely hard to replace if damaged) and resilience (capacity for coping 
with harm). We test our arguments for each dimension and their interactive effects using a geo-
referenced dataset for 1,162 MNE subsidiaries in 20 war-afflicted countries over 1987–2006. 
Management scholars have traditionally viewed wars and other political violence through 
the lens of political risk (Kobrin, 1979). Our timely analysis revisits a fundamental question for 
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theory on political risk: What makes some MNEs more vulnerable to political risk than others? 
By developing and testing an integrative framework for explaining firm vulnerability to external 
threats, we offer powerful evidence that within-country location is a critical aspect of strategy in 
extreme settings. In addition, we demonstrate how real options thinking – structuring redundancy 
into a portfolio of options and acquiring experience in similar contexts – can turn environmental 
uncertainty into a source of value as opposed to loss (Trigeorgis and Reuer, 2016). Our work also 
extends the resource based view by revealing important contingencies among the dimensions of 
vulnerability and by challenging the traditional appeal of exceptionally valuable resources.  
BACKGROUND, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
War in the Host Country and Foreign MNE Vulnerability  
  War is “a contested incompatibility where the use of armed force between two parties, 
of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in 
one calendar year” (Uppsala, 2015). We focus on war because, unlike terrorism or organized 
crime, its impact on firms is direct (Li, 2006). Also, while other types of political violence are by 
necessity unpredictable, war is typically subject to norms and conventions (Czinkota, Knight, 
Liesch, and Steen, 2010), making it more amenable to anticipation and subsequent strategizing. 
The literature on MNE-war linkages is largely normative, with a focus on firm complicity 
(Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007), ethical dilemmas (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 
2010), and political behavior (Getz and Oetzel, 2009). The emphasis on firm outcomes is more 
recent. Driffield, Jones, and Crotty (2013) look at why firms enter war-afflicted countries, noting 
firm size and ownership structure, along with industry and location, as important determinants. 
Oetzel and Getz (2012) examine MNE responses to war, showing that MNEs collaborate with 
local entities to manage violence, depending on the type of stakeholder pressure faced. Dai, Eden 
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and Beamish (2013) apply a geographical lens to examine MNE exposure in war zones, finding 
survival to be contingent on where and with whom subsidiaries are located.  
In this paper, we develop a theory of MNE responses to war that centers on the concept 
of vulnerability. In studies of natural disasters, vulnerability is used to gauge one’s ability to 
endure events such as earthquakes and hurricanes (Gallopin, 2006). Broadly defined as the 
potential for loss, vulnerability reflects susceptibility to damage that makes it hard for one to 
preserve its structure and achieve its goals (Adger, 2000). Vulnerability typically depends on 
three factors: one’s proximity to a threat, what it has at risk, and its ability to resist the threat’s 
impact. For example, an entity’s vulnerability to an earthquake is contingent on its distance from 
the epicenter, its likely losses due to the earthquake, and its emergency preparedness.  
We apply the same logic to our analysis, arguing that the vulnerability of MNEs to war 
depends on their 1) exposure (proximity to the war), 2) at-risk resources (potential for loss from 
the war) and 3) resilience (ability to withstand stressors related to the war). Given that “the 
impact of most political events varies from firm to firm and from project to project” (Kobrin, 
1982: 40), we expect the three vulnerability dimensions to exert unique impacts on firms. 
Vulnerability in the context of firms has been characterized in terms of different survival 
prospects (Auster and Aldrich, 1984). We similarly characterize vulnerability in terms of exit 
rate, that is, a foreign MNE’s failure to survive in the host country. From an MNE’s perspective, 
war creates a dilemma of whether to extricate its investment from a precarious situation with 
costs and benefits attached to both exiting and staying. More importantly, the MNE must decide 
how long to persevere in the face of adversity and risk the destruction of hard-to-replace assets.  
Failure to exit in a timely manner can entail costs that make it futile to sustain operations 
in the host country. War has the potential to drastically increase the cost of production, for 
5 
 
instance, by rendering roads unusable such that supplies need to be flown in (Guidolin and La 
Ferrara, 2007). War is also known to disrupt a firm’s sales and exports, destroy property, plant 
and equipment, and harm employees (Oetzel and Getz, 2012). Yet, even as staying in a war-torn 
country contributes to firm vulnerability, the cost of exit may be even higher. Since exits reduce 
local density, there may be returns to staying and opportunity costs from leaving, especially if an 
MNE – such as Shell in Nigeria (Frynas, 1998) – has a dominant position in the host country.  
We argue that it is important to assess the vulnerability of MNEs in war zones in the 
context not only of challenges and downside risk (Miller and Reuer, 1996), but also opportunities 
and upside potential (Miller and Eden, 2006). Both over- and under-estimating a foreign MNE’s 
costs of staying – as captured by its exposure, at-risk resources, and resilience – can lead foreign 
MNEs to make sub-optimal trade-offs in deciding if and when to exit. To further understand the 
dilemmas inherent in the exit-versus-stay calculus, we examine the independent and interactive 
effects of the three vulnerability dimensions on foreign MNEs in war-afflicted countries.   
Exposure 
External threats can be general and commonly experienced across entities, or specific to a 
particular entity. Exposure refers to the latter. Research on natural hazards depicts exposure in 
terms of geography. “Physical hazard exposure and susceptibility to hazards must be understood 
within a geographic framework, that is, the hazardousness of a specific place” (Cutter, Mitchell, 
and Scott, 2000: 731). In strategy research, location in the host country has long been recognized 
to affect the extent of political hazards experienced by a subsidiary (Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 
1990; Kobrin, 1979; Murtha, 1991). Location has also been shown in mega events to determine 
which firms are subject to abrupt changes at a given time (Tilcsik and Marquis, 2013).  
In the context of war, foreign MNEs tend to respond differently given their location in the 
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host country relative to the war zone. For example, in 2015 Shell left Nigeria (Bloomberg, 2015), 
even as General Electric (GE) invested $10 billion in new power plants (Caulderwood, 2014). 
While Shell was located in the politically violent Niger Delta, GE had locations in Abuja and 
Lagos, cities far removed from both the Niger Delta in the south and violence in the north.  
Because it is difficult to anticipate where and against whom war will strike (Hiatt and 
Sine, 2013), exposure generates levels of uncertainty that undermine the value of postponing 
exit. Given exposure to war, the usual opportunity costs associated with exercising a withdrawal 
option are kept at a minimum since opportunities to exploit any upside potential in the host 
country become precarious. This may explain why foreign MNEs, after choosing to initially cope 
with the civil war in Syria in 2013, accelerated their exit when Damascus and Aleppo became 
engulfed in violence (Fielding-Smith and Kerr, 2013). Even foreign oil MNEs with military 
protection from the government in Algeria – that chose not to leave despite having their natural 
gas plants blown up – noted that: “There is a limit. If [we] don’t think [we] can protect [our] 
people [we] will exit, as Chevron did in Sudan” (Krauss and Reed, 2013). We thus argue that:  
Hypothesis 1: The greater a foreign MNE’s exposure, the faster its rate of exit 
from a host country at war.  
At-Risk Resources 
Real options theory accords value to MNEs because they have options that span across 
national borders (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). In the case of discretionary actions (exit) and 
sunk costs, such options allow firms to “avoid future outlays in the event of negative signals […] 
and position themselves to seize upside opportunities systematically” (Tong and Reuer, 2007: 
216). Instead of weighing opportunities against threats inside a war-afflicted country, an MNE 
can consider the range of possible opportunities and threats faced by its global network as a 
whole. The value of opportunities in a country is thus a negative function of their substitutability 
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outside of the country, where decision to abandon operations depends on the presence of 
correlated options elsewhere in an MNE’s option portfolio (Vassolo, Anand, and Folta, 2004). 
We view the MNE as a portfolio of subsidiaries where each subsidiary is both a bundle of 
resources deployed by the parent firm to further its objectives (Dunning and Lundan, 2008) and a 
real option for future strategic choice (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Myers, 1977). Other 
subsidiaries of the MNE that can replace the activities or functions of a subsidiary are real 
options in the portfolio that “allow preferential access to future opportunities” (Bowman and 
Hurry, 1993: 762) and that can also facilitate the MNE’s withdrawal from a particular portfolio 
project (Trigeorgis, 1996). The former provides flexibility along the dimension of time, and the 
latter along the dimension of space. The fewer surrogates there are for a focal subsidiary, the 
more important the subsidiary is to the MNE’s global portfolio as a bundle of resources.  
From a resource bundling perspective, a subsidiary may be more at risk in the face of war 
if it accounts for a large or unique portion of an MNE’s production, sales or employment and/or 
operates in the host country for specific locational reasons that benefit the MNE group (e.g., to 
obtain quality inputs or to sell to a critically important market). In these cases, the subsidiary has 
a portfolio position within the MNE group that is not easily replicated, and, in the event of the 
subsidiary’s destruction, this facet of being hard to replace can pose non-trivial costs of staying. 
We thus conceptualize at-risk resources as the value of a focal subsidiary in terms of its 
“replacement options” within the MNE’s portfolio of subsidiaries. 
The resource based view, with its almost exclusive focus on the strengths of resources, 
overlooks the potential weaknesses – and the attendant costs – of valuable resources put in 
jeopardy. Logics rooted in “more and better” from the strategy literature may be problematic in 
contexts involving extreme danger where “less may be more”. Even in the literature on system 
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adaptation to natural hazards, resources are construed only in terms of their functional value – 
i.e., for creating slack and mitigating damage (Linnenluecke, Griffiths, and Winn, 2012).   
We argue, by contrast, for a broader conceptualization of resources that considers their 
at-risk value in extreme settings. Since valuable resources are by nature tacit, complex and firm-
specific (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990), they are not predisposed to imitation by rivals (Barney, 
1990) or even by a firm itself if lost. Such difficult-to-replace resources are context specific and 
only re-deployable in a very limited set of environments (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). 
Since valuable resources are required to overcome the costs of doing business abroad 
(Hymer, 1976), firms likely need to deploy resources of even greater value in high-risk countries. 
Precisely because these resources facilitate expansion abroad when doing “business as usual” 
(Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997), they can increase firms’ vulnerability if damaged. For example, 
during war-related kidnappings in Nigeria and Colombia, workers normally considered valuable 
assets became a source of vulnerability when their safety was threatened (Swanson, 2002).  
The at-risk value of a focal subsidiary presents a foreign MNE with a dilemma between 
staying (and risk losing hard-to-replace resources) and exiting (and risk incurring opportunity 
costs from abandoning real options). For a hard-to-replace subsidiary, we argue that exit is less 
likely because the costs imposed on the MNE network of closure would be immediate and 
readily estimated. For instance, oil MNEs that hold country-specific licenses and physical 
property often find it too expensive to leave a country (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010). MNEs in non-
extractive industries that shut host country operations also risk losing licenses, trademarks, and 
other intangible property to local firms. Due to localization, it could be very costly to exercise 
the option to abandon operations. The specificity to the MNE of resources with few replacement 
options thus imposes sunk costs on exit that may outweigh costs of staying (Williamson, 1985).  
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On the other hand, if a subsidiary can be relatively easily substituted in an MNE 
portfolio, the MNE may choose to close it in times of upheaval in order to limit any costs 
accruable from staying (Belderbos and Zou, 2009; Benito, 2005). The ability to shift assets and 
activities within the MNE group reduces exit costs. Studies on economic crises (Chung, Lee, 
Beamish, and Isobe, 2010) and foreign exchange crises (Miller and Reuer, 1998; Rangan, 1998) 
show that MNEs with options elsewhere are likely to divest troubled subsidiaries. We expect a 
similar response to war: Rather than be left vulnerable, MNEs with replacement options (for less 
at-risk but nonetheless valuable resources) will consider the costs to staying to be higher than 
those of exit and choose to exit. Especially in crises, real options in the form of alternate 
investment bundles provide firms with the flexibility to pursue new opportunities (Sirmon, 
Ireland, and Hitt, 2007).  
On balance, we expect foreign exit to be a high-cost maneuver that most MNEs would 
prefer to avoid or at least defer, especially under uncertainty. Exit costs are markedly higher if a 
subsidiary fulfills a critical role in the MNE group, and there are no or few alternatives to move 
operations elsewhere. While duplication in a portfolio of options reduces their realizable value in 
good times, it is the lack of such duplication that limits the value of options in a portfolio during 
bad times (Li and Chi, 2013). In such cases, subsidiaries without replacement options represent 
bundles of at-risk resources, where closure will likely disrupt MNE operations and result in large 
losses. Foreign MNEs with more at-risk resources in a host country will thus be slower to exit in 
response to war because the expected costs of exit exceed those of staying. We thus argue that: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater a foreign MNE’s at-risk resources, the lower its rate of 
exit from a host country at war.   
Resilience  
Resilience refers to the ability of entities to cope with external stressors and disturbances 
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(Adger, 2000). Resilience to an external threat depends on (i) impact resistance (the ability to 
withstand a damaging impact as it occurs) and (ii) recovery speed (the ability to restore functions 
to a pre-disturbance or even improved state) (Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2010). According to 
research on natural disasters, impact resistance is based on pre-existing capacities (Linnenluecke 
et al., 2012). This suggests that the ability of MNEs to confront and cope with threats in their 
environment depends on attitudes to risk developed from prior experience in war zones.  
The accumulation of experience in unstable countries has been shown to enable MNE 
adaptation to upheaval in other countries (Delios and Henisz, 2003), and adaptation reduces firm 
vulnerability to threats (Fichman and Levinthal, 1991). In work on natural disasters, adaptation is 
viewed as a part of resilience that reflects learning in response to disturbances (Carpenter, Brock, 
and Hanson, 1999). Learning from prior foreign investment is similarly considered indispensable 
for MNEs to develop the instinct needed to recognize and better respond to volatility abroad (Li, 
1995). Since MNEs that undergo extreme events have greater forecasting aptitude (Henisz, 
2004), and MNEs that can skillfully interpret the context are better at adapting to risky situations 
(Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007), MNEs with prior experience in politically risky countries should 
have greater adaptive capacity and faster recovery speed, that is, more ex ante resilience. Such 
MNEs should be better equipped to handle the outbreak of war and more likely to delay their 
exit.  
MNEs without experience in war-afflicted countries, on the other hand, are less likely to 
be resilient; they lack tolerance for political instability because a steadfast attitude towards 
volatility is acquired only over time (Li, 1995). While war is an extraordinary event for 
inexperienced MNEs, it may be perceived by experienced MNEs as a mere fluctuation in the 
host country’s level of political risk. Since “decisions depend on prior processes of human 
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perception and evaluation” (Hitt and Tyler, 1991: 328), experience in war-torn countries is likely 
key in diminishing managers’ perception of the threat from war. With more experience, resilient 
MNEs may have a higher threshold for tolerating the costs of staying in a war-afflicted country 
and refrain abandoning its operations early on, such that: 
Hypothesis 3: The greater a foreign MNE’s resilience, the slower its rate of exit 
from a host country at war. 
At-Risk Resources and Exposure 
When exposure to war is low, we expect that a foreign MNE’s costs of exit will exceed 
its costs of staying, especially if its resources invested in the host country are hard to replace. 
The limited threat combined with high stakes should prompt the MNE to stay or at least postpone 
exit. As a case in point, in Mali’s 2012 civil war, Randgold announced that it was “committed to 
Mali despite unrest”. Since its most productive mining complex was 350 kilometers from the 
capital city, where the violence was located (Reuters, 2012), the MNE would have suffered little 
in staying but incurred high costs in abandoning its lucrative operations. 
Yet, when exposure to war is high – posing significant and irreversible damage to a focal 
subsidiary and its employees – we argue that conditions change. While the economic cost of 
divesting an at-risk bundle of resources is high, the cost of staying for an exposed MNE is no 
longer confined to economic costs from firm closure, but also includes possible losses in terms of 
human lives. According to the resource based view, valuable resources have “isolating 
mechanisms” (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992) that stem from largely human-based processes: tacit 
knowledge, causal ambiguity, and unique historical conditions. The realization of value from 
these isolating mechanisms rests on their dedicated use in a certain time-space. In the event this 
time-space is disrupted, such resources – if exposed – suffer from a substantial reduction in 
value.  
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As Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2015) point out, dependency on the context can make a 
resource uniquely valuable to a firm, but also leave a firm vulnerable to changes in context. 
Whereas the inimitability and non-substitutability of resources preclude their replication by other 
firms (Barney, 1991), this at-risk dimension of resources increases the difficulties of replacing 
resources by a firm itself if exposed to harm. The greater the at-risk value of resources invested 
in the host country, the greater the loss to the foreign MNE should a threshold of exposure to war 
be exceeded. While a foreign MNE with hard-to-replace resources in the host country will prefer 
to stay to capitalize on such resources, its exposure can dramatically raise the costs of staying, 
especially as managers tend to perceive threats more accurately than opportunities (Jackson and 
Dutton, 1988). As exit becomes the only option for containing catastrophic loss, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 4: Greater at-risk resources positively moderates the relationship 
between a foreign MNE’s exposure and its rate of exit from a host country at war.   
Resilience and Exposure   
When foreign MNEs are exposed to war, we expect more priority to be placed on limiting 
losses than on maintaining host country operations. Given low exposure, pressures to exit may be 
minimal. However, when exposure imposes exorbitant costs on staying in the host country, the 
value provided by resilience becomes more apparent. MNEs with experience in politically risky 
countries should, in contrast with the average loss-minimizing MNE, have a higher threshold for 
fleeing from war and therefore greater resilience in resisting the impact of war. In practical 
terms, for instance, such experience may enable MNEs to find medical support and emergency 
assistance with greater ease. Given the time constraints on decision making typical in crisis 
situations, moreover, knowledge and experience acquired from operating in other politically 
risky countries can help managers to grasp the context faster (Hodgkinson and Clarke, 2007).  
Experience gained in specific settings furthermore reduces a firm’s tendency to follow 
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the decisions of other firms (Henisz and Delios, 2001; Lu, 2001). The ability to judge events in a 
war independent of the inevitable hype surrounding firm exits may induce even exposed MNEs 
to exercise their coping mechanisms and stay on. In alleviating the actual and perceived costs of 
being exposed to war, experience has the potential to reduce the urgency of exiting. Moreover, 
investments in risky locations typically occur due to strong locational draws (e.g., natural 
resources, large market), which motivate MNEs’ entry despite their knowing the risks. Having 
invested in such a location, MNEs have even greater incentive to stay on in order to capitalize on 
opportunities, since the difficulties of setting up a subsidiary abroad increase the value of the 
wait-and-see option during uncertain times (Caves and Porter, 1976). We thus predict that: 
Hypothesis 5: Greater resilience negatively moderates the relationship between a 
foreign MNE’s exposure and its rate of exit from a host country at war.   
METHODS 
Data and Sample  
We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 1,162 Japanese MNE subsidiaries operating in 
20 war-afflicted countries between 1987 and 2006. Data on 724 parent firms from the Nikkei 
Economic Electronic Databank System were matched with subsidiary data from Toyo Keizai’s 
Japanese Overseas Investments, by Country. The dataset covers all Japanese MNE investments 
abroad, and as such represents the most comprehensive source of data on MNEs in war-afflicted 
countries. War data were compiled from the Armed Conflict and Conflict Site datasets of the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, widely used by scholars and policy makers (Collier, Elliott, 
Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, and Sambanis, 2003). The composite risk ratings for countries 
in our dataset, according to International Political Risk Services, varied from 14.5 to 86.7 on a 
scale of 0 to 100, suggesting that they are not particularly different from other countries. 
To study MNE responses to war, we needed to pinpoint the locations of subsidiaries and 
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wars using geographical coordinates. The data collection process involved locating information 
(e.g., phone number, industry, founding year, host country) for subsidiaries prior to determining 
and coding their addresses with geographic coordinates. Latitudes and longitudes were coded 
annually to account for the time-varying nature of subsidiary and war zone locations. For least 
developed countries with arbitrary records and obscure translations of intersections instead of 
streets – where most of the sampled wars occurred – this process meant spending up to an hour 
on determining and geocoding each address. We also examined old news articles to determine 
the addresses of subsidiaries that had been closed. 
Dependent Variable 
Exit likelihood. Exit is a variable, Ext, that takes on a value of 1 if MNE x exits in year t, 
and 0 otherwise. Observations start in 1987 and continue until an exit occurs, or is right-censored 
in 2006. Closures and sell-offs of all Japanese equity ownership are treated as exits (Delios and 
Makino, 2003). There were 146 exits in total, consisting of 135 closures and 13 sell-offs.  
Independent Variables  
Exposure. We measured exposure by first geocoding the address of each subsidiary with 
annually-varying latitude and longitude coordinates. War zones were geocoded using their center 
and radius as the smallest circles containing violence (Buhaug and Gates, 2002). We then applied 
the great-circle distance formula to the latitude and longitude of the subsidiaries and the center of 
the nearest war zone to calculate a distance, from which the war zone radius was subtracted. The 
final variable was coded as 1 when the calculated distance was negative and as 0 otherwise.  
At-risk resources. The operationalization of this variable is based on the premise that 
subsidiaries are bundles of resources that can hold distinct structural positions and thus different 
real option values within the MNE’s global portfolio (Tong and Reuer, 2007). Characterized in 
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real options theory as a function of redundancies within an MNE (Belderbos and Zou, 2009), the 
value of a subsidiary is predicated on its network position and size in the MNE’s portfolio. The 
less replaceable it is by other subsidiaries within the MNE group, the greater its at-risk value. 
We therefore assessed at-risk resources by measuring the non-redundancy of a focal 
subsidiary (Chung et al., 2010), or its difficulty of being replaced by other subsidiaries in the 
MNE’s network. To determine the number of possible replacements for a subsidiary, we counted 
the subsidiaries in its parent’s portfolio in the same industry and at the same value chain stage 
(i.e., upstream or downstream). We then measured the at-risk value of a subsidiary by gauging its 
importance in terms of its size relative to replacements. To do so, we divided the employee count 
in the focal subsidiary by the employee count in its replacements. As shown in Equation 1.1: 
                                                              𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =    𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖=1                                                                  (1.1) 
ARRijt is the at-risk resources of MNE i in host country j, Eijkt is the employee count in a focal 
subsidiary k, and Eizt is the employee count summed over replacement subsidiaries z for the focal 
subsidiary in the MNE’s global portfolio (z=1,…, Z), all measured in year t. A lower 
denominator translates into a higher value on this variable and greater at-risk resources. 
Resilience. Resilience is the ability to cope with external stressors and disturbances 
(Adger, 2000) and has been characterized as “a latent, path-dependent capability that cannot be 
measured directly” (Ortiz and Bansal, 2015: 1). We created a proxy for resilience by performing 
a principal component factor analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation on the values of four 
variables, which yielded a principal component explaining 90.0% of the variance. The 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.95 suggests that the variables have good reliability. As Table 1 shows, the 
large loadings provide support for the convergent validity of the variables. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin statistic of 0.81, above the acceptable limit of 0.6, veriﬁed the sampling adequacy of 
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variables for the PCA (Kaiser, 1974). Bartlett’s test of sphericity (p=0.000) confirmed that the 
correlations between the variables were sufﬁciently large and therefore appropriate for PCA. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
The variables used to measure resilience are: i) the Political Risk Services (PRS) scores 
(reverse coded so that greater values reflect higher risk) of the countries in an MNE’s portfolio, 
weighted by a ratio of the MNE’s subsidiary count in a given country to its subsidiary count in 
the full portfolio, summed over all countries in the MNE’s portfolio, as denoted in Equation 1.2:   
                                                    𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  �𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
  x 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
                                                    (1.2) 
where WPRSit is the weighted PRS score of MNE i, PRSjt is the PRS score for country j and Sijt is 
the subsidiary count of MNE i in country j given n countries in MNE i’s portfolio (n=1,…, N), 
all measured in year t; (ii) the number of war-afflicted countries in an MNE’s portfolio; (iii) the 
number of subsidiaries an MNE has in war-afflicted countries; and (iv) logged MNE sales. The 
first three variables capture an MNE’s experience dealing with and attitude towards political risk. 
The fourth variable is a proxy for MNE size, since resilience also depends on an MNE’s capacity 
to absorb costs in coordinating subsidiaries in different countries (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994).  
Control Variables  
According to the foreign exit literature, exit may be a function of the age, performance, 
entry mode, and industry of a subsidiary; the sunk costs of its parent; and mimetic forces and 
macro conditions in the host country. We therefore included controls for these alternative 
explanations of foreign exit.  
At the subsidiary level, subsidiary age is used to account for host country experience 
(Chung and Beamish, 2005). Since profitable subsidiaries are less likely to be closed than non-
profitable ones (Mata and Freitas, 2012), we controlled for subsidiary performance using self-
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reports by managers. This variable has three ordinal levels: 1 for gain (baseline), 2 for breakeven, 
and 3 for loss. Since greenfield investments are less likely to be divested (Mata and Portugal, 
2000), we controlled for greenfield as 1 for greenfield entry and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies 
were included to account for whether the subsidiary is in a primary (baseline), manufacturing, 
wholesale, or service industry. Since divesting core businesses is harder (Li, 1995), we included 
a dummy variable parent industry to capture whether a subsidiary is in its parent’s core industry.  
 At the parent level, we controlled for sunk costs as the parent’s percentage of investment 
in a subsidiary. Given mimetic isomorphism in exit behavior, we controlled for peer exits, which 
is the number of Japanese subsidiaries in the same industry and host country as a focal subsidiary 
that exits in a year (Dai et al., 2013).  
At the country level, to account for the role of policy in shaping firm vulnerability 
beyond war’s physical impact, we included a policy stability variable to proxy the extent to 
which political actors are constrained in policy decisions (Henisz, 2000), with values ranging 
from 0 (least stable) to 1 (most stable). Finally, we controlled for market attractiveness of the 
host country using the ratio of FDI flows to GDP (Delios and Henisz, 2003).  
Statistical Analysis 
Our empirical work is concerned with the relative rates of exit of foreign MNEs from 
war-torn host countries. We therefore employ non-parametric Cox proportional hazard models to 
test the probability that exit occurs within a particular time interval, given firm survival up to that 
point (Cox, 1972). In order to accurately gauge rates of exit in response to war, we format 
multiple “onsets of risk” in our hazard models to capture true periods of war. For example, five 
risk onsets were modeled for Iran to reflect war during the periods 1987–1988, 1990–1993, 
1996–1997, 1999–2001, and 2005–2006. A focal subsidiary in Iran is assigned five IDs and its 
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observations during peace removed by stratifying on the IDs. While modeling multiple failures is 
common in survival analysis, our method of dealing with multiple onsets of risk with a single 
failure (i.e., exit) is novel. We use robust standard errors clustered by country in order to relax 
the assumption that exits within the same host country are uncorrelated. Because foreign exits 
require time (McDermott, 2010), time-varying predictors and controls are lagged by one year. 
The descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table 2. Subsidiaries had operated 
on average for 16.4 years in the host country, and 22% were located in war zones. In terms of 
performance, 68% of the subsidiaries had gains, 17% broke even, and 15% incurred losses. The 
most represented countries were the Philippines (29%), Thailand (29%) and Indonesia (23%), 
together accounting for 66% of the exits. The most common industries were automobile (15%), 
electronics (12%) and chemicals (11%), together accounting for 29% of the exits. We assessed 
multi-collinearity; the individual and mean variance inflation factors were below 2 for all 
models, and below the recommended threshold of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003). 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
RESULTS 
Results of the Cox proportional hazard analysis obtained using standardized coefficients 
are shown in Table 3. A positive coefficient implies both a higher likelihood of exit and an 
earlier rather than a later exit (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005). Model 1 presents the controls only. 
Models 2 to 5 consider the impact of exposure, at-risk resources, and resilience on exit. Models 6 
and 7 test the moderation of exposure by at-risk resources and resilience, respectively.  
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
We interpret our results using Model 8, the full model. We use hazard ratios, as shown in 
Table 4, to discuss the practical significance of our findings. The hazard ratio, which gives the 
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effect size, is computed as 100(eβ–1), or percentage change in the hazard with each one unit 
change in the predictor. A higher hazard ratio reflects a higher likelihood as well as a faster rate 
of exit (Tan and Vertinsky, 1996). Exposure is, as predicted in H1, positively associated with 
exit (β=0.50, p=0.000). The hazard ratio of 1.65 for exposure suggests that exit for exposed 
MNEs is 65% faster than for unexposed MNEs. H2 predicting that at-risk resources is negatively 
related to exit is also supported (β=–0.24, p=0.000). For MNEs with at-risk resources, the exit 
rate is reduced by 21%. Contrary to our theory, resilience has a positive impact on exit (β=0.59, 
p=0.000). H3 is thus not supported; more resilient MNEs exit 81% faster than less resilient ones. 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
H4 predicting faster exit given an interaction between exposure and greater at-risk 
resources is supported (β=0.59, p=0.000). In practical terms, having greater at-risk resources 
speeds up exit for exposed MNEs by 48%. We plot the results in Figure 1, which shows (as 
predicted) that when exposure is low, the level of at-risk resources has little effect on exit rates. 
When exposure is high, the positive relationship between the exit rate and exposure increases 
rapidly for MNEs with greater at-risk resources in the country. The graph is consistent with our 
theory that exposing at-risk resources renders exit more urgent, even though the presence of such 
resources would normally deter exit. Estimating marginal effects, we see that the effect of 
exposure differs by the level of at-risk resources. Exposure increases exit rates by 16% for 10 
units of at-risk resources, 46% for twice this level, and almost 95% for 40 units.  
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
In support of H5, the exposure and resilience interaction term has a negative coefficient 
(β=–0.60, p=0.002). For exposed MNEs, resilience slows exit by 45%. As shown in Figure 2, 
less resilient MNEs exit at similar rates regardless of their exposure, although exit is slightly 
20 
 
faster for exposed MNEs. The graph also confirms our predictions that even unexposed MNEs 
with less urgency to exit will exhibit faster exit if they have less resilience, as MNEs are more 
likely to overreact to unfamiliar situations. Given high resilience, however, exit is slower for 
exposed MNEs. Below 2 units of resilience, exposure has a minimal effect on exit rates (0% to 
3%). Yet, past this threshold level the discrepancy in exit rates becomes non-trivial, as exposed 
MNEs are able to delay exit and unexposed MNEs can exit faster. At higher levels of resilience, 
exit rates for exposed MNEs are reduced by nearly 3% at 2 units of resilience and 13% at 4 units. 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
Robustness Checks  
In addition to using regressors measured at time t-1 in our models, we use instrumental 
variables (IV) methods to address the possible endogeneity of our independent variables due to 
unobserved heterogeneity. As shown in Table 5, Models 1 to 3 present the results from the IV 
first-stage regressions. Models 4 to 6 report the results from the second-stage regressions with all 
three predictors treated as endogenous and replaced by their fitted values from the first-stage 
regressions. Models 7 to 9 contain the results from the second-stage regressions in which the 
focal predictors and interactions are instrumented for. The results were robust to the introduction 
of all regressors treated with exogenous instruments. We elaborate on our approach below. 
--- Insert Table 5 about here --- 
We begin by estimating the relationship between MNE exit rate and exposure using 
treatment effects models to account for potentially non-random location in war zones. In these 
models, a first-stage regression is estimated where each MNE’s propensity to locate in war zones 
at t-1 is the dependent variable and the instrumental variable is a measure of war zone coverage 
in the host country at t-2. In our search for an appropriate instrument, we looked for variables 
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that were strongly correlated with the likelihood of being in a war zone, but not directly related 
to exit rates (Wooldridge, 2010). While the proportion of the host country’s area affected by war 
at t-2 is a deterministic predictor of whether an MNE will have a war zone location at t-1 
(R2=0.490, p=0.000), war zone coverage at t-2 does not directly affect the exit rates at t of MNEs 
that are already in the host country at t-1 (p=0.299). Next, the estimated propensities are used in 
lieu of actual propensities in a treatment effects model. The null hypothesis in the Wald test of 
independent equations is that the first and second stage equations are independent (ρ=0). The test 
reveals that there is no treatment effect of exposure on exit rates (Wald χ2 = 0.06, p=0.807). 
We then employ exogeneity tests to examine whether the at-risk resources and resilience 
variables are endogenous. In the tests we include two instruments – at-risk resources and 
resilience – both measured at time t-2. Lagged versions of variables are commonly used in time 
series or panel data as instruments as they tend to directly affect the focal endogenous variables 
without rendering a direct impact on the outcome variable (Greene, 2000; Kennedy, 2003). The 
Wu-Hausman F-statistic is 1.638 (p=0.201) for at-risk resources, suggesting the variable does 
not violate the assumption of no correlation between the independent variable and error term. In 
contrast, the Wu-Hausman F-statistic is 4.298 (p=0.038) for resilience. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis that resilience is exogenous at the p=0.05 level suggests the endogeneity of resilience.  
Our use of survival analysis precluded the use of a formal IV approach to address the 
endogeneity of resilience. There are currently no statistical tools for addressing endogeneity in 
the context of proportional hazard models such as the Cox model (Atiyat, 2011) because IV 
methods are only able to provide unbiased estimates in certain settings, one of which is a linear 
model (Fisher, 2003). We therefore use generalized method of moments (GMM) IV estimation, 
which is sufficiently flexible to control for unobserved heterogeneity in panel data (Blundell and 
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Bond, 1998). Also, in line with our instrument choice in the exogeneity tests, lagged endogenous 
variables are commonly employed in GMM IV estimation (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2003). 
As with formal IV approaches, the consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the 
validity of the instruments. Models 2 and 3 of Table 5 show that their coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant in the first-stage regressions, suggesting that they are sufficiently strong. 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests provide additional evidence for their significance. Further confirming 
the relevance of our instruments, the first-stage F statistic is 752.734 (p=0.000) for at-risk 
resources and 638.378 (p=0.000) for resilience – both above 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997) – 
indicating that the instruments are exogenous and strong (Shea partial R2=0.673 and 0.394).  
We also conducted tests of identification, as weak instruments can distort test statistics 
and cause misleading statistical inference (Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron, 1996). The Anderson 
canonical correlations and Kleibergen-Paap tests for under-identification yielded statistics with 
p=0.000 for both at-risk resources and resilience, suggesting that the models are identified, with 
instruments correlated sufficiently with the instrumented variables. The Cragg-Donald Wald F 
test for weak identification yielded statistics greater than the 10% maximal IV size Stock-Yogo 
critical values, which enabled us to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are weak and 
to confirm the relevance of our instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005). We present the results of all 
tests for the exogeneity and relevance of the instruments in the bottom panel of Table 5. 
In an additional effort to address endogeneity, we ran models by stratifying on a variable 
indicating whether MNEs had political ties, which may be correlated with unobserved resources 
or capabilities that also affect exit rates. Using a dummy variable to account for this in a pooled 
sample of MNEs with and without political ties is inappropriate since having political ties may 
be endogenous, that is, not random (c.f. Frynas, 1998). We applied a different baseline hazard to 
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each stratum, where the unobserved frailty is assumed to be the same for MNEs in a stratum.  
We also checked the robustness of our results to alternative operationalizations of at-risk 
resources. To begin with, we adjusted the measurement of “replacement subsidiaries” in the 
original formula for this variable to account for (i) other subsidiaries of the parent in the host 
country and (ii) other subsidiaries of the parent in the same industry and at the same stage of the 
value chain in the host country. Next, reverting to the original conception of replacement options 
in the global sense, we created an alternate proxy using the ratio of sales in the focal subsidiary 
to sales summed over its replacement subsidiaries in the parent’s international portfolio.  
We then ran our models with an added control for subsidiary sales, which is not included 
in the main analyses because of potential confounding with the employees variable. In addition, 
since firms with fewer than 100 employees may lack the capacity to strategically respond to war 
(Oetzel and Getz, 2012), we ran our models on a sample of subsidiaries that had more than 100 
employees. Because wars can spill over into neighboring countries and exhibit region-level 
characteristics, we estimated robust standard errors clustered by region for all models.  
Finally, we ran models controlling for the characteristics of the war. First, we checked if 
the source of the incompatibility mattered by adding a categorical variable denoting whether the 
war was fought over territory (baseline), government, or both. Second, we accounted for war 
type using a variable with three categories indicating whether the war was interstate, civil, or 
both. Third, we included a control for war intensity, which was measured using a dummy 
variable where 0 refers to 25 to 999 annual battle-related deaths and 1 refers to at least 1000 
annual battle-related deaths. All results remained largely unchanged in sign and statistical 
signiﬁcance, even improving in some instances relative to our reported results.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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We examine a form of political instability (war) and a type of strategic response (exit) 
that are increasingly salient worldwide. We provide insight into how foreign MNEs respond to 
external threats in the host country using the concept of vulnerability, which we theorize in terms 
of exposure, at-risk resources and resilience. With war as a natural laboratory, we demonstrate 
the role of sub-national location in determining the at-risk value of resources in extreme 
contexts. While MNEs can be vulnerable (i.e., due to having high stakes or lacking experience in 
war zones) without necessarily being exposed, we offer definitive evidence that exposed MNEs 
are vulnerable. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice regarding 
strategic responses in high-risk contexts and conclude with agendas for future research. 
While political risk scholars and managers have long asserted that firms experience war 
in idiosyncratic ways, research using country-level data has yielded at best equivocal evidence. 
Past empirical efforts in examining firm strategy in response to war and other external threats 
have been too far removed from the level of analysis of greatest concern to decision makers: on 
the ground in war zones. An important contribution of this work is thus the introduction of a 
means of quantifying sub-national exposure to war that challenges the space-neutrality of 
political risk within countries. In our study, for example, the conflict in southern Thailand shaped 
firm activity in Pattani province, but had no discernable impact in Bangkok. The Mindanao 
uprising in the Philippines and the violence in northeastern India were likewise characterized by 
geographically non-uniform distributions of warfare (Rustad, Buhaug, Falch, and Gates, 2011).  
Our findings are corroborated by research showing that exposure to adversity enables 
firms to be better at coping with sudden environmental changes, more so than being endowed 
with favorable resources (Bradley, Aldrich, Shepherd, and Wiklund, 2011). Our analyses reveal 
that greater at-risk resources lead MNEs to stay on during war, which, given our findings for 
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exposure, lends support to the real options thinking that there are key benefits to firms staying 
flexible in dynamic environments even when resource specificity is high (Trigeorgis and Reuer, 
2016). The negative effect of at-risk resources on exit rates reflects real options logics pertaining 
to incentive and feasibility. First, the possible foreclosure of re-entry reduces the reversibility of 
an exit, which “significantly reduces for a long time the variety of choices that would be possible 
in the future” (Henry, 1974: 1006). Given such exorbitant opportunity costs associated with exit, 
MNEs with at-risk resources invested in the host country have less motivation to exit. Second, 
given the time and search costs required to assess the salvage value – the next best use – of 
dedicated at-risk resources in the host country, it may be difficult to expedite exit.  
Even as at-risk resources make it costly to leave a country, the occurrence of war where 
these resources are located can exponentially increase the costs of not exiting. Our results for the 
moderation of exposure by at-risk resources show precisely this. We advance the notion of hard-
to-replace value to show that extreme contexts can render some resource attributes more salient 
for decision-making than others. Specifically, the at-risk dimension of valuable resources is 
compounded by their difficulty of being replaced. Our work on replacement options for these at-
risk bundles of resources further demonstrates the importance of viewing resource investments in 
terms of their ability to generate choices (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). Since wars are often far-
removed from political centers (Rustad et al., 2011), the exposure of at-risk resources make exit 
– not protection from the host country ruling regime – the sole means of reducing vulnerability. 
Our findings suggest that superior resources, which normally form the basis for value 
creation, can actually increase losses in anomalous situations where these resources are subject to 
harm. By highlighting the impact of resources from becoming absent instead of being present, 
we contend that it is not resources per se but rather their replacement costs that become salient in 
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strategic considerations when said resources are exposed to external threats. In contrast to the 
economic notion of costs associated with replacing a particular profit stream (Lindenberg and 
Ross, 1981), replacement costs in strategy may be attributable to the challenges in re-developing 
time-sensitive opportunities, project-specific relationships and human capital should these be 
lost. As such, replacement costs may be especially hard to quantify economically in war zones.  
The inability to apply rational arguments in life-threatening situations may explain our 
findings for resilience. The main effect results suggest that resilience leads to faster exit. Since 
pessimistic risk estimates are made in the face of danger, and perception of danger is the most 
critical determinant of exit in emergencies (Perry, 1979), the exit imperative for decision makers 
may not be tempered by resilience. Nonetheless, the GMM IV models with endogeneity-treated 
resilience lend support to our theory that resilience helps to defer exit. For resilient but exposed 
MNEs, however, the GMM IV results show that the simplest way to cope may be to leave.  
Our measure for resilience has some limitations that create opportunities for future 
research. First, we compare relative rates of exit, where the mean resilience in our sample is 
lower than the median. Low resilience, combined with high risk, makes exit rather than staying 
the more likely outcome. Second, we measured resilience in terms of war zone experience, but 
experienced MNEs may have more experience incurring costs associated with staying on in war 
zones. Indeed, MNEs with experience in politically risky countries should be better able to assess 
the costs and benefits of exiting versus staying in a war-torn country and choose to “cut their 
financial losses”, lest there be human losses. Since iterative comparisons of business processes in 
different contexts increase the rate at which firms respond to turbulence (Ndofor, Sirmon, and 
He, 2011), experienced MNEs may exit even faster using foreign exit routines developed 
elsewhere. Because certain MNEs receive benefits when war erodes state control – e.g., Shell’s 
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dominant position in Nigeria’s oil industry was predicated on the disarray in petroleum policy 
caused by war (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003) – resilience measured as political ties may have 
yielded different results. Third, our resilience measure included a proxy for parent size. With 
more slack to buffer operations from external shocks, larger MNEs may be able to delay their 
exit from a country even when the rationale for staying becomes obscure (Nachum and Song, 
2011). However, larger MNEs may also be more vulnerable to policy shifts in turbulent times 
than smaller MNEs due to their propensity to control crucial sectors and resources in the host 
country (Kobrin, 1978).  
By quantifying the location-delimited exposure of MNEs to external threats, we highlight 
the importance of geographical theorizing and modeling for management research. Given the 
consistently positive relationship we found between exposure and vulnerability, managers 
considering entry into a volatile country need to pay special attention to investment location 
within the country. Since the threat of physical harm can vary sporadically at the provincial or 
even neighborhood levels (Dai et al., 2013), local knowledge may be of singular importance.  
Our findings contribute further to practice by showing the role of location in determining 
the extent to which resources represent an asset or a liability in extreme contexts. If resources 
face exposure to harm, managers should be especially selective in deploying valuable resources 
abroad. Also, notwithstanding perceptions that associate MNE exit with failure (McDermott, 
2010), managers should have exit strategies in place prior to entering a country. Since processes 
of acquiring and divesting must be synchronized to create value (Sirmon and Hitt, 2009), MNE 
investments in risky locales may lose value unless a threshold for tolerating exposure to external 
threats is established ex-ante. Just as exit strategies should accompany foreign entries, re-entry 
options may be valuable for exiting firms if threats subside (Hadjikhani and Johanson, 1996). 
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 In treating hard-to-replace subsidiaries in the MNE portfolio as resources at risk, our 
work supports the notion that having a global network does not always or necessarily provide 
MNEs with real options that reduce downside risk (Miller and Reuer, 1998; Reuer and Leiblein, 
2000; Tong and Reuer, 2007). That is, our study of real options in light of environmental 
contingencies suggests that any operational flexibility prescribed in the theory may be 
outweighed by the costs of maintaining exposed at-risk resources. Our results show that in war 
zones, otherwise valuable resources can come to represent a source of vulnerability that make it 
too costly to stay in a host country, unless MNEs can draw on redundancies located in safe 
countries in the global portfolio. While our study examines the exit rate of foreign MNEs in 
response to war, we expect that similar time-sensitive decisions, such as sequential exits and the 
likelihood or ability to exercise re-entry options, can also be analyzed using the real options lens. 
Further, the notion of replacement options we developed here can be used to examine how other 
outcomes, such as exit mode or firm performance, are affected by a subsidiary’s non-redundant 
position in its parent’s portfolio.   
  Received wisdom in real options dictates that functional duplication between any pair of 
options in a portfolio can lessen the option value of one if the other is exercised (Anand, Oriani, 
and Vassolo, 2007; Belderbos and Zou, 2009; Li and Chi, 2013; McGrath, 1997; Trigeorgis, 
1996; Vassolo et al., 2004). In our study in the context of war, it is precisely such duplication 
and exercise of the replacement option that help to preserve the value of a focal option, i.e., the 
closed subsidiary. We thus offer novel evidence for the positive effect of redundancy in extreme 
contexts, in support of the ex-ante structuring of substitutability into option portfolios (Trigeorgis 
and Reuer, 2016). Since real options reflect preparedness, our results for at-risk resources and 
resilience point to the importance of option value over earnings value and that of early 
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investment in shadow, or hidden, options (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). Indeed, with portfolios of 
options also conceived of as knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992), research on real options can 
yield insights for resilience in terms of experience and learning. This work thus highlights the 
value of real options thinking – where solutions can precede problems – for volatile contexts. 
Our work provides an impetus to identify the conditions under which resilience may be 
more or less necessary for firms to survive – and more importantly, thrive – in extreme contexts. 
In countries characterized by instability, resilience is indispensable to MNEs with incentives to 
prolong their stay. We examined one such scenario, where the operations of a subsidiary would 
be hard to replicate elsewhere. Other sensitive contexts prompt further analyses on the boundary 
conditions of different types of resilience. As an example, if legitimacy concerns are greater than 
physical threats, MNE size may not provide as much protection as local stakeholder goodwill or 
home-host relations (Rangan and Sengul, 2009). In the same vein, firm experience in other war 
zones may not help as much as political risk insurance if the violence is targeted. Determining 
other moderators and mediators in the relationship between resilience and MNE strategy in 
turbulent contexts will be particularly valuable for the study of political risk.  
By examining foreign MNE responses to war in the host country, this paper advances 
theory on important dimensions of firm vulnerability and delivers prescriptions for managing 
other external threats, such as natural disasters, disease outbreaks and mega events (Oh and 
Oetzel, 2011; Tilcsik and Marquis, 2013). We thus consider the scope – and imperative – of this 
inquiry to be far broader than the context of war. While we chose this empirical setting in order 
to isolate the mechanisms we posited to underlie firm vulnerability to war, the contingent nature 
of external threats has pervasive analogues in other settings. Contexts characterized by large-
scale disorder are increasingly widespread, where not only a firm’s performance but also its mere 
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survival is affected by its capacity to alleviate exposure and vulnerability. Because the extent to 
which this link exists may vary across industries and countries, we believe that how firms deal 
with environmental turbulence is a complex phenomenon that deserves more attention. 
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Table 1: Principal Component Factor Analysis of Resilience Variables 
Resilience Variable Mean S.D. Loading Variance 
Explained 
KMO 
Statistic 
Weighted PRS Scores Summed over 
all Countries in MNE’s Portfolio 
0.2720 0.1726 0.9292 90.00% 0.8628 
Number of War-Afflicted Countries 
in MNE’s Portfolio 
3.8756 4.0771 0.9543 4.85% 0.7796 
Number of War-Afflicted Country 
Subsidiaries in MNE’s Portfolio 
8.3220 12.1566 0.9822 4.29% 0.7078 
MNE Sales (Logarithm) 12.6307 2.3613 0.9280 0.86% 0.9430 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlationsa 
 Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Exposure 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00      
2. At-Risk Resources 0.50 0.54 0.00 27.75 0.00     
3. Resilience -0.32 0.56 -0.67 4.02 0.01 -0.06    
4. Subsidiary Age 16.37 9.00 1.00 73.00 -0.13 0.03 0.13   
5. Sunk Costs 53.13 29.89 0.00 100.00 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.01  
6. Financial Breakeven 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.02 
7. Financial Loss 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.06 
8. Greenfield  0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.11 
9. Manufacturing 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.09 -0.16 0.00 0.08 
10. Wholesale 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.08 0.14 -0.02 0.01 
11. Services 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.04 -0.05 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 
12. Parent Industry  0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.36 0.07 0.00 
13. Peer Exits 1.09 1.78 0.00 8.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.08 
14. Policy Stability 0.37 0.14 0.04 0.60 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 -0.09 
15. Market Attractiveness 1.81 1.97 -2.76 40.16 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 
  6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
7. Financial Loss -0.23         
8. Greenfield  0.05 0.01        
9. Manufacturing -0.04 0.01 -0.05       
10. Wholesale 0.08 -0.02 0.06 -0.45      
11. Services -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.45 -0.20     
12. Parent Industry  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.23 -0.11 -0.28    
13. Peer Exits 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.11 -0.06 -0.08 0.07   
14. Policy Stability 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.05  
15. Market Attractiveness 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.13 -0.02 0.16 -0.05 
a n = 5,554. Correlations in bold are significant at p < .05. 
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Table 3. Coefficient Estimates of Cox Proportional Hazard Analyses Predicting Exit Ratea 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Controls Exposure 
At-Risk 
Resources Resilience 
Main 
Effects 
Exposure* 
ARR 
Exposure* 
Resilience 
Full  
Model 
Subsidiary  0.166 0.280 0.171 0.066 0.210 0.212 0.212 0.212 
Age (0.05/0.00) (0.07/0.00) (0.05/0.01) (0.06/0.18) (0.07/0.00) (0.07/0.01) (0.06/0.00) (0.07/0.00) 
Sunk Costs -0.390 -0.374 -0.395 -0.379 -0.387 -0.396 -0.397 -0.404 
 (0.06/0.00) (0.07/0.00) (0.06/0.00) (0.07/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.09/0.00) 
Financial  0.364 0.338 0.363 0.228 0.155 0.146 0.121 0.110 
Breakeven (0.16/0.02) (0.14/0.01) (0.15/0.02) (0.15/0.25) (0.18/0.41) (0.18/0.23) (0.20/0.36) (0.20/0.59) 
Financial Loss 0.448 0.281 0.379 0.364 0.118 0.106 0.114 0.104 
 (0.12/0.00) (0.18/0.12) (0.09/0.00) (0.14/0.01) (0.24/0.63) (0.25/0.17) (0.26/0.12) (0.26/0.69) 
Greenfield  -0.618 -0.505 -0.599 -0.708 -0.554 -0.545 -0.539 -0.526 
 (0.18/0.00) (0.21/0.04) (0.18/0.00) (0.17/0.00) (0.16/0.00) (0.16/0.00) (0.16/0.00) (0.16/0.00) 
Manufacturing -0.173 0.056 -0.181 -0.160 0.059 0.026 0.136 0.099 
 (0.14/0.20) (0.13/0.73) (0.14/0.45) (0.10/0.34) (0.10/0.57) (0.11/0.42) (0.12/0.25) (0.12/0.40) 
Wholesale 0.320 0.877 0.364 0.318 0.868 0.848 0.938 0.916 
 (0.27/0.25) (0.39/0.02) (0.25/0.17) (0.23/0.17) (0.35/0.01) (0.36/0.02) (0.32/0.01) (0.32/0.01) 
Services 0.251 0.499 0.257 0.142 0.470 0.480 0.489 0.506 
 (0.17/0.11) (0.16/0.00) (0.17/0.13) (0.20/0.16) (0.19/0.01) (0.19/0.03) (0.19/0.01) (0.19/0.01) 
Parent  -0.489 -0.439 -0.468 -0.230 -0.277 -0.286 -0.281 -0.287 
Industry (0.09/0.00) (0.13/0.00) (0.10/0.00) (0.09/0.03) (0.12/0.02) (0.12/0.02) (0.11/0.02) (0.12/0.01) 
Peer Exits 0.591 0.631 0.600 0.572 0.623 0.621 0.633 0.632 
 (0.16/0.00) (0.16/0.00) (0.16/0.00) (0.16/0.00) (0.15/0.00) (0.15/0.00) (0.16/0.00) (0.15/0.00) 
Policy  -0.113 -0.090 -0.112 -0.104 -0.091 -0.083 -0.116 -0.104 
Stability (0.12/0.80) (0.09/0.21) (0.11/0.16) (0.09/0.26) (0.08/0.25) (0.08/0.31) (0.08/0.24) (0.08/0.21) 
Market  -0.976 -1.283 -0.962 -0.757 -1.042 -1.057 -1.080 -1.094 
Attractiveness (0.21/0.00) (0.32/0.00) (0.21/0.00) (0.19/0.00) (0.25/0.00) (0.26/0.00) (0.28/0.00) (0.27/0.00) 
Exposure  0.522   0.579 0.569 0.495 0.501 
  (0.14/0.00)   (0.18/0.00) (0.18/0.01) (0.15/0.01) (0.15/0.00) 
At-Risk    0.023  -0.046 -0.210 -0.077 -0.241 
Resources   (0.05/0.19)  (0.08/0.56) (0.03/0.00) (0.08/0.15) (0.04/0.00) 
Resilience    0.444 0.453 0.478 0.572 0.593 
    (0.04/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.10/0.00) (0.11/0.00) 
Exposure X       0.411  0.394 
ARR      (0.09/0.00)  (0.10/0.00) 
Exposure X        -0.632 -0.596 
Resilience       (0.19/0.00) (0.19/0.00) 
N 8,130 6,080 8,033 7,423 5,551 5,551 5,551 5,551 
pseudo R2 0.050 0.061 0.050 0.059 0.071 0.073 0.074 0.076 
Wald χ2  1877.64 3784.02 2245.16 3104.73 3471.05 15746.75 29243.64 21307.07 
AIC 2801.007 1728.552 2739.096 2382.374 1455.167 1453.942 1452.049 1451.272 
BIC 2885.047 1815.818 2829.983 2472.235 1554.493 1559.889 1557.997 1563.841 
a Standardized coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country and P>|z| in brackets; two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4. Hazard Ratios of Cox Proportional Hazard Analyses Predicting Exit Ratea 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Controls Exposure 
At-Risk 
Resources Resilience 
Main 
Effects 
Exposure 
*ARR 
Exposure* 
Resilience 
Full  
Model 
Subsidiary  1.180 1.323 1.187 1.069 1.234 1.236 1.236 1.236 
Age (0.06/0.00) (0.09/0.00) (0.06/0.00) (0.06/0.25) (0.08/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.08/0.00) 
Sunk  0.677 0.688 0.673 0.685 0.679 0.673 0.673 0.668 
Costs (0.04/0.00) (0.05/0.00) (0.04/0.00) (0.05/0.00) (0.05/0.00) (0.05/0.00) (0.05/0.00) (0.05/0.00) 
Financial 1.440 1.402 1.437 1.256 1.168 1.158 1.129 1.116 
Breakeven (0.23/0.02) (0.20/0.02) (0.22/0.02) (0.19/0.12) (0.22/0.41) (0.21/0.43) (0.23/0.55) (0.23/0.59) 
Financial Loss 1.565 1.324 1.461 1.439 1.125 1.112 1.121 1.109 
 (0.18/0.00) (0.24/0.11) (0.14/0.00) (0.20/0.01) (0.27/0.63) (0.28/0.67) (0.29/0.66) (0.29/0.69) 
Greenfield  0.539 0.603 0.549 0.493 0.575 0.580 0.584 0.591 
 (0.10/0.00) (0.13/0.02) (0.10/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.09/0.00) (0.09/0.00) (0.10/0.00) (0.10/0.00) 
Manufacturing 0.841 1.057 0.834 0.852 1.061 1.026 1.145 1.104 
 (0.12/0.21) (0.14/0.67) (0.12/0.21) (0.08/0.10) (0.11/0.57) (0.12/0.82) (0.13/0.24) (0.13/0.40) 
Wholesale 1.377 2.403 1.438 1.374 2.382 2.336 2.555 2.500 
 (0.37/0.24) (0.92/0.02) (0.36/0.15) (0.31/0.16) (0.84/0.01) (0.84/0.02) (0.82/0.00) (0.81/0.01) 
Services 1.285 1.648 1.293 1.153 1.601 1.617 1.630 1.658 
 (0.22/0.15) (0.26/0.00) (0.21/0.12) (0.23/0.47) (0.30/0.01) (0.31/0.01) (0.31/0.01) (0.32/0.01) 
Parent Industry  0.613 0.645 0.626 0.794 0.758 0.751 0.755 0.750 
 (0.06/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.06/0.00) (0.07/0.01) (0.09/0.02) (0.09/0.02) (0.09/0.01) (0.09/0.01) 
Peer Exits 1.806 1.880 1.822 1.772 1.864 1.861 1.883 1.881 
 (0.30/0.00) (0.29/0.00) (0.29/0.00) (0.29/0.00) (0.28/0.00) (0.28/0.00) (0.29/0.00) (0.29/0.00) 
Policy Stability 0.893 0.914 0.894 0.901 0.913 0.920 0.890 0.901 
 (0.10/0.33) (0.08/0.29) (0.10/0.32) (0.09/0.27) (0.07/0.25) (0.07/0.30) (0.07/0.17) (0.07/0.21) 
Market 0.377 0.277 0.382 0.469 0.353 0.348 0.340 0.335 
Attractiveness (0.08/0.00) (0.09/0.00) (0.08/0.00) (0.09/0.00) (0.09/0.00) (0.09/0.00) (0.09/0.00) (0.09/0.00) 
Exposure  1.686   1.785 1.766 1.641 1.651 
  (0.24/0.00)   (0.33/0.00) (0.32/0.00) (0.25/0.00) (0.25/0.00) 
At-Risk    1.024  0.955 0.810 0.926 0.786 
Resources   (0.05/0.63)  (0.08/0.56) (0.02/0.00) (0.08/0.35) (0.03/0.00) 
Resilience    1.559 1.573 1.613 1.772 1.810 
    (0.06/0.00) (0.12/0.00) (0.14/0.00) (0.17/0.00) (0.19/0.00) 
Exposure X       1.508  1.483 
ARR      (0.14/0.00)  (0.15/0.00) 
Exposure X        0.531 0.551 
Resilience       (0.10/0.00) (0.10/0.00) 
N 8130 6080 8033 7423 5551 5551 5551 5551 
pseudo R2 0.050 0.061 0.050 0.059 0.071 0.073 0.074 0.076 
Wald χ2  1877.64 3784.02 2245.16 3104.73 3471.05 15746.75 29243.64 21307.07 
AIC 2801.007 1728.552 2739.096 2382.374 1455.167 1453.942 1452.049 1451.272 
BIC 2885.047 1815.818 2829.983 2472.235 1554.493 1559.889 1557.997 1563.841 
a Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets; two-tailed tests. 
41 
 
Table 5. Treatment Effects and GMM Instrumental Variable Analyses Predicting Exit Ratea 
 First Stage Second Stage 
 Dependent Variables Main Effects  Full Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Exposure 
At-Risk 
Resources  Resilience 
Treatment: 
Exposure 
IV GMM: 
ARR 
IV GMM: 
Resilience 
Treatment: 
Exposure 
IV GMM: 
ARR 
IV GMM: 
Resilience 
Subsidiary Age -0.024 0.004 0.017 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.001 
 (0.02/0.12) (0.02/0.79) (0.03/0.55) (0.00/0.01) (0.00/0.01) (0.00/0.11) (0.00/0.01) (0.00/0.01) (0.00/0.00) 
Sunk Costs 0.012 0.018 -0.013 -0.014 -0.010 -0.010 -0.015 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.01/0.06) (0.01/0.02) (0.01/0.19) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) 
Financial Breakeven 0.023 -0.013 0.063 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.005 
 (0.01/0.04) (0.02/0.48) (0.08/0.46) (0.00/0.04) (0.00/0.10) (0.01/0.79) (0.00/0.38) (0.00/0.12) (0.01/0.29) 
Financial Loss -0.001 -0.005 0.013 0.013 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.020 0.012 
 (0.01/0.86) (0.02/0.77) (0.07/0.85) (0.01/0.01) (0.01/0.01) (0.01/0.00) (0.00/0.09) (0.01/0.02) (0.01/0.25) 
Greenfield  0.007 0.040 -0.063 -0.022 -0.025 -0.027 -0.022 -0.023 -0.051 
 (0.03/0.95) (0.02/0.02) (0.08/0.42) (0.01/0.03) (0.01/0.01) (0.01/0.02) (0.01/0.03) (0.01/0.02) (0.02/0.02) 
Manufacturing 0.032 0.023 -0.017 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.03/0.22) (0.01/0.06) (0.04/0.67) (0.00/0.45) (0.00/0.69) (0.00/0.82) (0.00/0.07) (0.00/0.64) (0.01/0.73) 
Wholesale 0.049 -0.058 -0.086 0.019 0.018 0.005 0.020 0.013 0.005 
 (0.03/0.03) (0.02/0.00) (0.05/0.12) (0.01/0.00) (0.01/0.00) (0.01/0.65) (0.01/0.00) (0.01/0.16) (0.01/0.55) 
Services 0.009 -0.033 -0.178 0.018 0.018 -0.005 0.018 0.010 0.007 
 (0.02/0.93) (0.01/0.00) (0.10/0.10) (0.01/0.02) (0.01/0.03) (0.01/0.43) (0.01/0.02) (0.01/0.14) (0.01/0.32) 
Parent Industry -0.008 -0.030 -0.120 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.002 -0.013 
 (0.02/0.67) (0.01/0.00) (0.02/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.13) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) 
Peer Exits 0.015 -0.005 -0.047 0.019 0.020 0.008 0.019 0.009 0.010 
 (0.02/0.51) (0.01/0.43) (0.02/0.01) (0.01/0.01) (0.01/0.01) (0.00/0.00) (0.01/0.01) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) 
Policy Stability -0.083 0.005 -0.016 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.07/0.00) (0.01/0.69) (0.02/0.50) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.03) (0.00/0.01) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.06) (0.00/0.92) 
Market Attractiveness 0.049 0.006 0.010 -0.014 -0.010 -0.004 -0.013 -0.004 -0.028 
 (0.04/0.06) (0.01/0.48) (0.03/0.77) (0.01/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.03) (0.01/0.02) (0.00/0.05) (0.01/0.00) 
Exposure  -0.002 -0.022 0.020 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.239 
  (0.02/0.92) (0.04/0.60) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.01/0.02) (0.00/0.01) (0.05/0.00) 
At-Risk Resources 0.002  -0.024 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.032 
 (0.00/0.90)  (0.01/0.04) (0.00/0.73) (0.00/0.64) (0.00/0.02) (0.00/0.19) (0.00/0.03) (0.01/0.00) 
Resilience -0.007 -0.034  0.019 0.025 0.019 0.022 0.028 -0.272 
 (0.02/0.80) (0.01/0.01)  (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.01/0.01) (0.00/0.00) (0.00/0.00) (0.09/0.00) 
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Exposure X ARR       0.015 0.017 0.049 
       (0.01/0.02) (0.00/0.00) (0.01/0.00) 
Exposure X Resilience      -0.015 -0.016 0.145 
       (0.01/0.04) (0.01/0.02) (0.03/0.00) 
Instrumental 
Variables          
War Zone Coverage 1.260         
 (0.03/0.00)         
Lagged ARR  0.798        
  (0.02/0.00)        
Lagged Resilience   0.671       
   (0.10/0.00)       
Constant -0.163 -0.198 -0.432       
 (0.03/0.00) (0.03/0.00) (0.03.0.00)       
N 6,480 6,453 4.544 6,480 6,453 4,544 6,335 6,452 2,678 
pseudo R2 0.490 0.685 0.480 0.030 0.032 0.024 0.032 0.020 0.028 
Shea's partial R2  0.673 0.394       
First-stage F-statistic  752.734 638.378       
Wald χ2    5081.24 7541.88 3021.21 5816.04 11718.47 4060.30 
a Standardized coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets; two-tailed tests. 
Tests of Endogeneity for Treatment Effects (ML) Regressions:                           
Wald-test of independent equations for main effects model: chi2(1)=0.84 (p=0.3583)     
Wald-test of independent equations for full model: chi2(1)=0.40 (p=0.5255)     
Tests of Endogeneity, Relevance, and Validity of Instruments for GMM IV Regressions (ARR):                                                        
Wu-Hausman F-test for exogeneity of ARR variable: F(1,6433)=1.63799 (p=0.2006)     
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity of ARR variable: Durbin (score) chi2(1)=1.64241 (p=0.2000)   
Anderson canonical correlations test of under-identification for instrument lagged ARR: Chi2(1)=3134.31 (p=0.0000)  
Cragg-Donald Wald F test of weak-identification F-statistic=3039.39; Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value: 7.03  
Kleibergen-Paap test of under-identification: Chi2(1)=37.36 (p=0.0000)      
Tests of Endogeneity, Relevance, and Validity of Instruments for GMM IV Regressions (Resilience):                                                        
Wu-Hausman F-test for exogeneity of resilience variable: F(1,2659)=4.29808 (p=0.0383)    
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity of resilience variable: Durbin (score) chi2(1)=4.32181 (p=0.0376)   
Anderson canonical correlations test of under-identification for instrument lagged resilience: Chi2(1)=26.08 (p=0.0000)  
Cragg-Donald Wald F test of weak-identification F-statistic=13.08; Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value: 7.03  
Kleibergen-Paap test of under-identification: Chi2(1)=37.28 (p=0.0000)      
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Figure 1. Relative Exit Rates of MNEs as a Function of Exposure and At-Risk Resources 
 
Figure 2. Relative Exit Rates of MNEs as a Function of Exposure and Resilience 
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